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Abstract:  This paper examines the financing of disaster risk management. Future 
climate and disaster risks are predicted to impose increasing financial pressure on the 
governments of low-lying atoll nations. The aftermath of a disaster, such as a cyclone, 
requires financial means for quick response and recovery. We quantify the 
appropriate levels of financial support for expected disasters in Tuvalu and Kiribati 
by building on the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative 
(PCRAFI) calculated likely costs for disasters. To these, we add estimates of the 
potential effects of distant cyclones, droughts, sea level rise, and climate change, as 
they are predicted to affect low-lying atoll islands. This paper focuses on the potential 
contribution of the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) of Tuvalu and Kiribati in reducing 
reliance on foreign aid for ex-post disaster risk management. We forecast the future 
size of SWFs using Monte Carlo simulations. We examine the long-term sustainability 
of SWFs, and the feasibility of extending their mandate for disaster recovery.  
JEL Codes: C53, E17, Q01, Q54, Q56 
                                                          
 Sincere thanks to the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) Secretariat for allowing me to use their TTF data and 
for letting me attend the 2015 TTF Board Meeting. Also, many thanks to the Ministry of Finance & 
Economic Development of Kiribati for allowing me to use their Revenue Equalizer Reserve Fund 
(RERF) data and for their guidance. Most of all, my thanks to Ilan Noy for his suggestions. We also 
acknowledge insights from Michael Wulfsohn on MC modelling, and for comments and feedback from 
participants of the 4th International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction, the 2017 Pacific Update 
Conference, and the 58th New Zealand Association of Economists Conference. 
 
 
2 
 
Keywords: Disasters, sovereign wealth funds, atoll islands, disaster fund, resilience. 
1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012; 2014) emphasized the 
increasing risks associated with extreme weather events due to climatic change. 
Increasing frequency of high intensity storms are results of climate change and global 
warming in sea temperatures (Mendelsohn et al., 2012; Mei et al., 2015). The negative 
effects of climate-related disasters are greatly felt by developing countries, causing 
financial losses to increase (Briguglio, 1995; Heger, Julca, & Paddison, 2008; Klomp & 
Valckx, 2014).   
These events create significant budget volatility and fiscal risk to Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) who lack the funding and capacity to ensure proper financial 
protection and adequate fiscal response to disasters. Most PICs face complexities in 
raising and accessing liquidity in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, due to 
constraints related to their sizes, borrowing capacity, limited access to international 
financial markets, narrow revenue bases, and heavy reliance on imports and aid 
(World Bank, 2015b). Climate-induced sea-level rise poses an additional and 
existential threat to small and low-lying atoll states in the Pacific like Tuvalu and 
Kiribati, with moving populations or protecting the atolls at very high cost the only 
long-term solutions (OECD & World Bank, 2016).   
Numerous studies point out the unique exposure of Pacific Islands to risks due to 
their economic, geographical, and environmental vulnerabilities (see World Bank, 
2014; Taupo, Cuffe, & Noy, 2016; OECD & World Bank, 2016). These intertwined 
vulnerabilities can reverse development efforts in these Pacific atoll islands 
(Victoriano, 2015). For instance, the IMF estimated that damage of 1% of GDP from a 
disaster could be expected to decrease growth by 0.7 percentage points for Pacific 
Islands (Cabezon, Hunter, Tumbarello, Washimi, & Wu, 2015).  
Aid plays a pivotal role in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) development, 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Low-lying SIDS like Tuvalu 
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and Kiribati are well supported by development aid, but increasing impacts of 
disasters are seen as emerging issues that require further funding assistance. In terms 
of quick response to climatic disasters (e.g., cyclones and droughts), the smallness of 
the islands and distances between them, and resultant communication and 
transportation difficulties, are major issues impeding swift response and recovery 
efforts. For example, both Tuvalu and Kiribati were significantly affected by the 
Tropical Cyclone Pam (TC Pam) in 2015 even though the islands were a great distance 
away from the cyclone path (see Taupo & Noy, 2016; Noy & Edmonds, 2016). The 
fiscal response to such catastrophes as the 2015 TC Pam has further demonstrated 
Tuvalu’s dependency on aid donors.  
Noy and Edmonds (2016) calculated a welfare risk scorecard for Tuvalu based on 
the model used by Hallegatte et al. (2017) to produce disaster management scorecards 
for countries (Hallegatte, Bangalore, & Vogt-Schilb, 2016). Worryingly, they measured 
the overall risk to welfare for Tuvalu to be 0.98, higher than all other countries 
measured in this way by the World Bank. Noy and Edmonds (2016, p. 22) concluded 
that risk to welfare in Tuvalu is the highest implying that for “every dollar of damages 
to assets will also ‘translate’ into a dollar (98 cents) of lost welfare/wellbeing for 
Tuvalu”.  
The sizes of these SWFs and the increasing income they generate display their 
national importance. Therefore, safeguarding and ensuring that these funds are put 
into efficient, effective, and sustainable use is paramount.1 Suggestions have further 
emerged on the potential of these funds to act as financial instruments to facilitate 
disaster risk reduction. Since small, low-lying atoll islands are vulnerable and exposed 
to climatic disasters, the focus on designing strong buffers with sustainable financing 
mechanisms to counter these unexpected shocks is imperative.  
                                                          
1 Over the years, these funds have gained a reputation for prudent management guided by explicit 
rules that are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Angelo et 
al. (2016) consider the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) the most successful public fund in the Pacific, in 
terms of clear establishment structure by a treaty, clear purpose, and being a management and 
investment policy that deserves a model reputation for effective use of trust funds for small island 
state economic development (http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/155763/adb-
says-tuvalu-trust-fund-considered-most-successful-in-pacific). 
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As far as we are aware, no forecasts have been produced for the success of the 
Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) or Revenue Equalizer Reserve Fund (RERF) in the long run, 
nor any analysis of their feasibility and sustainability in providing financing 
mechanisms for disaster preparation and response. The possibility of extending TTF 
coverage to disasters apart from the provision of government support has been 
proposed but remains unquantified.2 This study aims to assess the feasibility and 
sustainability of these funds to support and contribute to disaster funds. Additionally, 
the paper intends to enhance understanding of potential options available for DRR 
and disaster response for Tuvalu and Kiribati. Current findings can then be 
generalised to other Pacific or SIDS settings. The next section describes the data and 
explains the methodology, section 3 details the results, and conclusions are presented 
in section 4. 
2. Data and Methods 
We employed the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method to forecast the future of the 
TTF and RERF. The MC simulation method was used to model the probability of 
possible outcomes from our time series data.  We used time series data on both the 
TTF and RERF. Data are yearly from financial years 1987 to 2016 and 1984 to 2016 for 
Tuvalu and Kiribati, respectively. Data on the TTF were gathered from the TTF 
Secretariat of the Tuvalu Government, while the RERF annual values were acquired 
from the Kiribati’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.3 Annual reports 
on the Funds and the national budgets were also used to complement these data.4 
The MC simulation (or stochastic sampling) method generates random numbers with 
a given probability distribution.5 Wulfsohn (2015) analysed the impact of investment 
                                                          
2 This was raised in several meetings in Tuvalu, including the TC Pam Meeting, National Summit for 
Tuvalu for the new National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2015-2020 and the 2015 Tuvalu 
TTF Board Meeting (also mentioned in their 2015 TTFAC Report). 
3 Data for RERF were gathered from both the Ministry of Finance & Economic Development and their 
official website (http://www.mfed.gov.ki/). 
4 Other Pacific Islands with SWFs were also approached for their data, but declined. 
5 There are two main categories of MC method, namely MC simulation (or stochastic sampling) and 
MC integration. For our case, we used the Monte Carlo simulation method which runs an algorithm 
that generates random numbers with given probability distribution. A function that returns the value 
of x such that, with the probability p, a normal random variable with mean mu and standard 
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return uncertainty on the long-term sustainability and stability of income from the 
Compact Trust Funds (CTFs) in the North Pacific, covering the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). He used a 
Monte Carlo investment return simulation model to simulate the effects of investment 
return volatility. In our case, we used it on an investment portfolio with a given 
starting value, an average annual return value, a standard deviation or volatility of 
return per annum, and assumptions on possible reinvestment and withdrawals.  
An example is when we generate a random rate of return for one year from today 
by using a function that assumes that the rate of return follows a normal distribution. 
We get one by using a random function, where the average of that normal distribution 
is the average rate of return with a volatility or standard deviation of return.6 There 
are many possible returns, therefore we can generate other possible returns a year 
from now. For the ending balance, we multiply the beginning balance by the annual 
rate of return and add assumptions (e.g., adding investment) by the end of the year. 
A stream of possible returns goes up to 34 years (i.e., from 2017 to 2050).7 We then 
update and adjust beginning balances for the following years. Therefore, one possible 
outcome is ending with about $1 billion in 2050. We set up and generate 10,000 
possible ending values for our portfolio, and from that we will have a reasonable idea 
of what our ending value could be,8 assuming that we calculate the 5% percentile of 
possible ending values and get $300 million. So, based on this probability, we can say 
that there is a 95% chance that the TTF will have more than $300 million (or 5% chance 
                                                          
deviation sigma takes on a value less than or equal to x. See Glasserman (2003) and Kalos and 
Whitlock (2008) for discussion on the development of MC methods and their application to financial 
engineering.  Generating of random numbers and random variables are comprehensive discussed in 
Bratley et al. (1987), Devroye (1986), Niederreiter (1992), Fishman (1996), Gentle (1998), and others. 
6 The average rate of return and standard deviation of return are based on past data. As percentage of 
SWF, the average rate of return is 7.06% and 4.7% for TTF and RERF, respectively. Likewise, the 
standard deviation of return is 5.04% and 3.5% for TTF and RERF, respectively. 
7 One could choose any ending year that they preferred, but for this case we set the end year to 2050 
due to the fact that Ferris, Cernea, & Pertz (2011) argued that Pacific islands (particularly low-lying 
islands like Tuvalu and Kiribati) could possibly be forced to migrate and be displaced by 2050 due to 
the effects of climate change. 
8 The law of large numbers ensures estimate convergence to the true value as the number of draws 
increase, thus reducing sampling errors and uncertainty (Glasserman, 2003).  
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of having something less than $300 million) at the end of 34 years, if returns continue 
as they historically have. 
3. Results and Discussions 
In the following, we assess risk estimates supplied by the Pacific Catastrophe Risk 
Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) for Tuvalu and Kiribati to determine 
the required contributions into disaster funds before discussing the forecast results 
from the two models under discussion.  
 
3.1 Assessing Risk and Determining Contribution to Disaster Funds 
Predictions of cyclone risks have been underestimated in the Pacific, particularly for 
low-lying atoll islands (Noy, 2016). To compute appropriate values required for 
contributions from SWFs into disaster funds, we started with the current estimated 
Average Annual Loss (AAL) calculated by PCRAFI for the two countries.9 The 
computed AAL from PCRAFI estimates that annual economic losses averaged over 
the 10,000 realisations of next-year activity. Moreover, the adverse consequences are 
measured from expected losses for three assets consisting of buildings, major 
infrastructure, and valuable crops (World Bank, 2013b). However, the models used by 
PCRAFI in risk analysis only calculate losses from earthquakes and tropical cyclones. 
Therefore, in addition to the AALs produced by PCRAFI, we consider unaccounted 
factors for low-lying atolls, namely: (1) distant cyclones; (2) climate change; (3) 
droughts, and (4) sea level rise.  
Firstly, the PCRAFI model did not recognize distant cyclones such as Tropical 
Cyclone Pam (TC Pam) and Tropical Cyclone Ula (TC Ula) as potential disasters for 
low-lying islands like Tuvalu. They only accounted for nearby cyclones in their 
models. Recently, Taupo & Noy (2016) quantified the impacts of a distant cyclone (TC 
Pam) which passed about 1,000 km away from Tuvalu. We accounted for distant 
cyclones by using the estimated cost of damages from TC Pam, for instance, and the 
                                                          
9 Hallegatte (2013) discusses the basic measure that assesses the exposure of assets during a 
catastrophe, called the Exceedance Probability (EP) curve, where the area below the constructed EP 
curve is the AAL, which is the expected amount of loss on average per year for a certain location. 
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loss and damages for Tuvalu at 10% of GDP based on both the ADB (2015) and Taupo 
& Noy (2016)10. Even Kiribati, which was much further away from TC Pam’s path than 
Tuvalu, was severely affected, with damages estimated by IMF (2016) at around 4% 
of GDP.11 According to the World Bank (2016), a Category 5 cyclone has been a 1 in 10 
year event12 for Fiji, Tonga and Samoa, while the cyclone return period for the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu is 1 in 5 year event.13  In this connection, we used a 1 in 
10 year scenario for our distant cyclone calculations.14 Building onto the PCRAFI AAL, 
we then adjusted the current AAL to include distant cyclones, thus increasing it to 
$731,738 (or an increase of 128%) for Tuvalu.15  Similarly, we also adjusted the AAL 
for Kiribati to include distant cyclones, which amounted to $1,219,704 (or an increase 
by 221%).16 
Secondly, the expected changes in frequency and intensity of cyclones are of 
serious concern for low-lying SIDS. We therefore incorporated the effects of climate 
change over time into our calculations of AALs. In accounting for these characteristics 
                                                          
10 Estimated damages of $4.12 million for Tuvalu. The World Bank (2016) estimated more than 
USD$10 million in damage, which is equivalent to 27% of the GDP. The World Bank (2015a) had a 
higher estimate of overall costs, standing at $14 million or 33.6% of GDP. 
11 See International Monetary Fund (2016), IFRC (2016) and Radio New Zealand (2015) for details on 
the impacts of TC Pam, particularly on three of the Southern Islands of Kiribati. 
12 A 1 in 10-year event is the probability of occurrence in any given year which also means a 
recurrence interval of 10 years (or return period of 10 years) or a 10% chance of occurrence in any 
given year. 
13 According to the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO (2011), “the tropical cyclone archive 
for the Southern Hemisphere indicates that between the 1969/70 and 2006/07 cyclone seasons the 
centre of 33 tropical cyclones passed within approximately 400 km of Funafuti. This represents an 
average of eight 
cyclones per decade. Tropical cyclones were most frequent in El Niño years (12 cyclones per decade) 
and least frequent in La Niña years (four cyclones per decade).”  
14 Assuming that a Category 5 cyclone close to Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands are likely to be 
encountered as distant cyclones like TC Pam. Vanuatu was the closest to the TC Pam when it was 
within Category 5 strength, hence it was extremely affected with attributable loss and damages 
amounting to USD$449.4 million which is equivalent to 64.1% of GDP (Government of Vanuatu, 
2015). 
15 For consistency, since both Tuvalu and Kiribati use Australian Dollars (AUD), unless stated in other 
currencies we will use the AUD with a currency conversion rate of USD$1=AUD$1.31197. The adjusted 
AAL for Tuvalu is derived from the sum of the current AAL USD$243,709=AUD$319,738 and the 
distant cyclone part of $412,000 (i.e. $4.12 million or 10% of GDP, divided by the distant cyclone return 
period of 10). 
16 In 2015 prices, Kiribati’s GDP was USD$160,121,929 (or AUD$210,075,167). The adjusted AAL for 
Kiribati is derived from the sum of the current AAL USD$289,186=AUD$379,403 and the distant 
cyclone component of $840,301 (i.e. $8,403,006 or 4% of GDP, divided by the distant cyclone return 
period of 10).  
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of cyclones, we: 1) allowed for a 9% increase in intensity (or strength of winds) of 
cyclones within the South Pacific, as was calculated in Noy (2016)17; 2) adjust for the 
cyclone damage related to the 3.8th power of wind speed measure stated by Strobl 
(2012) in his paper on hurricanes in the Caribbean, and 3) account for the 2% decrease 
in cyclone frequency in the South Pacific that was argued by Noy (2016). Since the 
effects of the increase cyclone intensity are far more significant than the effects of the 
decrease cyclone frequency, the overall impact of climate change is likely to be highly 
destructive.18 These expected changes are reflected in our cyclone AAL readjustments. 
To proceed, we separate the two AAL components of earthquakes and cyclones so we 
can readjust the cyclone part to account for distant cyclones, and for climate change 
in terms of potential changes in cyclone intensity and frequency. Hence, the adjusted 
overall AAL derived by accounting for earthquakes, cyclones, distant cyclones and 
climate change is $918,277.19 Similarly, Kiribati will likely incur an overall AAL of 
$1,567,461.20  
Thirdly, we accounted for droughts by using the estimated costs from a recent 
severe drought event and the expected drought return period. There are very few 
reports that assess the monetary costs of droughts in the South Pacific.21  According to 
the DesInventar Database, Tuvalu suffered monetary losses of USD$15 million due to 
                                                          
17 Noy (2016) calculations on changes in frequency and intensity of cyclones are based from Siqueira 
et al. (2014). 
18 Since the cyclone intensity is about 30% stronger and the cyclone frequency is only -2%. 
19 Since our PCRAFI AAL represents the combination values of earthquakes and cyclones, we then 
split the cyclone component to enable us to compute the effects of cyclone intensity and frequency. 
First, we extracted the cyclone component, 33% of the original AAL ($106,579), and added the distant 
cyclone AAL of $412,000, which sums up to $518,579. Then we multiplied by 1.093.8 to capture the 
cyclone intensity, thus arriving at $719,508. Then we multiplied by frequency change of 0.98 to arrive 
at $705,118, or the adjusted AAL (including cyclones, distant cyclones, cyclone intensity, cyclone 
frequency) without the earthquake component. So, adding the earthquake component of $213,159 
back into the AAL corresponds to the adjusted overall AAL of $918,277.  
20 Likewise, for Kiribati, we multiplied straight the distant cyclone AAL of $840,301 with 1.093.8 to 
capture the cyclone intensity effects, thus arriving at $1,341,353. Then we multiplied by the frequency 
change of 0.98 to come up at $1,314,526 or the adjusted AAL (including cyclones, distant cyclones, 
cyclone intensity, cyclone frequency) without the earthquake component. So, adding the earthquake 
component ($379,403) back into the AALs corresponds to the adjusted overall AAL of $1,567,461. 
21 Not only that, the impact of a drought depends on factors such as the drought’s length, meaning it 
is often hard to quantify the impacts of droughts in monetary values in relation to agriculture and 
health associated costs. 
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the drought in 1998, which was around 117% of GDP.22 It seems that the calculated 
losses may have been overestimated, so we resorted to calculating the impact of the 
drought using available information from the most recent 2011 drought report by 
Sinclair et al. (2012). Based on our summations from the report, the estimated loss and 
damage to Tuvalu was $2,072,045, around 4% of 2011 GDP.23 The Australian Bureau 
of Meteorology and CSIRO (2011) projected severe drought occurrence once every 20 
years for Tuvalu. Therefore, our AAL for the drought in Tuvalu corresponds to 
$103,602. Extrapolating our computations from the case of Tuvalu for Kiribati results 
in expected costs of $10,153,021, with an AAL of $507,723.24 Hereafter, the adjusted 
overall AALs for Tuvalu and Kiribati now correspond to $1,021,879 and $2,075,112, 
respectively. 
 
  
                                                          
22 DesInventar database also recorded the 2011 drought, but with no monetary losses. The EM-DAT 
database did not record the 2011 drought for Tuvalu, but recorded the 2009 drought for Kiribati. 
23 GDP of USD$39,312,016 or AUD$51,576,185, according to the World Bank. Note that the calculated 
costs from the 2011 drought only include impact on agriculture, while excluding health due to its 
complexity in translating to monetary values. For agriculture, we used ArcGIS software to compute 
plantation areas and used market prices in our calculations. 
24 In 2015 prices, Kiribati’s economy is 4.9 (i.e. USD160,121,929/USD32,673,277) times bigger than 
Tuvalu’s economy. Multiplying the cost of the drought (AUD$2,072,045) by 4.9 results to 
AUD$10,153,021 (i.e. 4.83% of GDP), which is the expected cost of the disaster for Kiribati. Therefore, 
dividing the drought’s estimated cost of AUD$10,153,021 by the Kiribati’s GDP of AUD$210,075,167 
then multiply by a 100 to convert to percentage, we get 4.83%. 
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Figure 1: Flood Areas by sea-level on Funafuti Island. 
 
 
 
Lastly, we used the effects of an increase in sea level for the case of Funafuti 
(capital of Tuvalu), where an increase by one meter in sea level would leave 15% of 
the land inundated on Funafuti Island (see map in Figure 1). Noy (2016) shows that 
the sea level in Tuvalu is projected to rise up by 24cm by 2050. Arguably, this increase 
would inundate 7.8% of the land. Sea level rise would exacerbate the impact of 
cyclones and tsunamis in this context. Therefore, we factored the expected increase in 
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sea level into the AALs. This is reflected in an increase in overall expected AALs to 
$1,101,586 and $2,236,971 for Tuvalu and Kiribati, respectively.25 These AALs 
corresponds to 2.45% of GDP for Tuvalu and 1.06% for Kiribati. 
 
Figure 2: Annual Average Loss (AAL) Adjustments for Tuvalu and Kiribati.  
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Figure 2 illustrates the adjusted AALs for Tuvalu and Kiribati, built on current 
PCRAFI AALs and adjusted to account for distant cyclones, climate change, droughts, 
and sea level rise. Under these conditions, the TTF and RERF would have amassed 
overall estimated contributions to their disaster funds at the end of the financial year 
2050 in the order of $37.5 million and $76.1 million, respectively.26 In the following 
section, we will present the forecasting results for the two SWFs together with 
scenarios including estimated contributions to their disaster funds using the two 
forecasting approaches discussed below. 
 
3.2 Investment Return Simulation 
The progression of the size of these SWFs over time, including inputs of drawdowns 
and investments according to their account structure and rules are set out in Figure 3 
and Figure 4 for the TTF and RERF, respectively. Generally, they show the distribution 
and spread of possible values (or ending outcomes) of the funds over time. The 95th 
percentile line can be interpreted as having 95% of simulations below it (and 5% 
                                                          
25 Multiplied overall AAL with 1.078. 
26 These figures are direct contributions from the TTF to the disaster fund in 2016 prices, excluding 
other contributions from other potential sources. 
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simulations above).  Likewise, 5% of simulations are below the 5th percentile line (and 
95% simulations above). The median is represented by the 50th percentile. A 
customary perception for an investment portfolio is the notion of increasing 
uncertainty as we stretch time further into the future, which is portrayed by the 
widening gap between the different percentile lines (see figure 3 and figure 4). 
 
Figure 3: TTF forecasted performance from 2017 to 2050 with contributions to the Disaster 
Fund. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and modelling. The disaster_aal is the 50th percentile of TTF with 
incorporated contributions to the disaster fund using the adjusted AAL (fixed based on the calculated 
AAL in 2016 prices) as the annual contribution over time. The disaster_swf is the 50th percentile of the 
TTF with adjusted calculations to include the adjusted AAL as a percentage of the TTF, so that it 
changes overtime based on forecasted values of the TTF. The disaster_estdist is the 50th percentile of 
the TTF with estimated distribution of annual losses. 
 
As well as the forecasted median (50th percentile) of the SWF without any 
contributions to a disaster fund in Figure 3 and Figure 4, we added two other 
forecasted median scenarios, namely: 1) Disaster_aal (unbroken blue line) representing 
the 50th percentile with contributions to a disaster fund using the adjusted AAL as the 
annual contribution over time; 2) Disaster_swf (unbroken orange line) representing the 
50th percentile with contributions to a disaster fund derived from the adjusted AAL in 
relation to the SWF; and 3) Disaster_estdist (unbroken grey line) representing the 50th 
percentile with contributions to a disaster fund derived from the estimated 
13 
 
distribution of annual losses. The adjustments in (2) correspond to annual 
contributions as a percentage of the SWF.27 This pathway of using the percentage of 
AAL on SWF would accumulate total estimated contributions by 2050 of about $97 
million for the TTF and $126 million for RERF.28  Figure 3 and Figure 4 reveal that the 
TTF and RERF have around a 50% chance of reaching $0.73 billion and $1.73 billion 
by 2050, respectively.29 
 
Figure 4: RERF forecasted performance from 2017 to 2050 with contributions to the Disaster 
Fund. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and modelling. The disaster_aal is the 50th percentile of RERF with 
incorporated contributions to the disaster fund using the adjusted AAL (fixed based on the calculated 
AAL in 2016 prices) as the annual contribution over time. The disaster_swf is the 50th percentile of the 
RERF with adjusted calculations to include the adjusted AAL as a percentage of the RERF, so that it 
changes overtime based on forecasted values of the RERF. The disaster_estdist is the 50th percentile of 
the RERF with estimated distribution of annual losses. 
                                                          
27 We used the adjusted AAL as a percentage of SWF size in 2016 values for our annual contribution 
(i.e. 0.685% and 0.288% for TTF and RERF, respectively), thus continuously using this percentage over 
time, therefore the annual contributions changes over time based on the SWF size, which is 
sustainable in a sense.    
28 This aim for the TTF maintained value to reach $200 million by 2020 was raised in the 2015 TTF Board 
Meeting (I attended this closed meeting on November, 2015) and later became a goal in the 2017 
National Budget of Tuvalu (see Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2016). This target was 
also raised by the Minister of Finance & Economic Development (Hon. Maatia Toafa) in the recent 
parliament session on the 23rd of March, 2017, which was accessed on a live stream of the radio Tuvalu 
on http://listen28radiocom.radiostream321.com/ . Based on the model, Figure 2 shows that the 
TTF has about 50% chance of meeting the Government’s aim to reach $200 million by 2020. 
29 TTF is much larger than RERF in per capita terms.  
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Intuitively, the effects of contributing to a disaster fund in the forecasted 
performance of the SWFs are displayed by a downward shift in the median with an 
increasing gap as we move into the future. Both the TTF and RERF are sustainable in 
the long run without any contributions to their disaster funds as they have upward 
trends in the median over time.  Similarly, these SWFs are also sustainable in the long-
term if they contribute to their disaster funds but at a lower median over time. 
However, contributing to disaster funds from a SWF poses risks to the growth and 
development of SWF itself.   
Under the current structures, the TTF and RERF experienced average annual 
drawdowns of 7.395% of GDP (or 2.06% of TTF size) and 5.3% of GDP (or 1.44% of 
RERF size), respectively. However, the alternative structures that contribute into 
disaster funds would increase annual drawdowns of the current structure by 2.6 
(0.68% of TTF size) and 1.1 (0.29% of RERF size) percentage points for Tuvalu and 
Kiribati, respectively. On the other hand, the current average contributions into SWFs 
for the TTF is approximately 7.422% of GDP, which is only $0.011 million above the 
average annual drawdowns. By contrast, the average annual contributions into the 
RERF for Kiribati are far lower than the average annual drawdowns, by 
approximately $8.2 million. With the newly assumed responsibility of contributing 
into disaster funds, the alternative structures for drawdowns and contributions will 
change. The average annual drawdown as a percentage of the SWF would likely to 
increase by percentage points of 0.68 for the TTF and 0.29 for the RERF.  
4. Conclusion 
While much focus in the Pacific has been on improving economic sustainability, partly 
through strengthening the management of reserves in SWFs, the establishment of 
solid and sustainable disaster funds for preparedness and response is indispensable 
for SIDS like Tuvalu and Kiribati. To refrain from reallocating budget earmarked for 
development purposes to be utilised for immediate disaster response, Tuvalu and 
Kiribati can rely on disaster funds to provide an adequate financial buffer. Without 
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contributions from SWFs to disaster funds, both the TTF and RERF are sustainable in 
the long run. Based on our forecasts on imposed scenarios, they are also likely to be 
feasible and sustainable even if they contribute to disaster funds.  
One argument for not allocating money from the SWF for disasters is that it would 
decrease aid. Consequently, we ask who should fund the disaster fund? The 
international community could contribute to the disaster fund, but will that conflict 
with its willingness to pay for recovery after a disaster.  
Several other possible ways to fund the disaster fund might be possible. First, the 
government can have full ownership of its disaster fund, maybe through a loan from 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or World Bank (WB) to provide the start-up 
resources (e.g. $5 million for the establishment of the Falekaupule Trust Fund) and 
invest the fund off-shore, leaving it to develop and build on its own interests without 
drawing out its gains.  To boost the growth of the disaster fund, the government will 
need to invest money into it from its own revenues (including the TTF). If income from 
the TTF is used, it would probably be necessary to have the support of Australia and 
NZ, as board members of the TTF and continuing contributors.  
In principle, the TTF responds well to external economic shocks, but it does not 
extend a consistent treatment for natural disasters. Natural disasters are often left to 
be dealt with by the government, people, and aid. In fact, economic shocks and natural 
disasters are both disruptions that affect the economy and the people, and so could be 
treated the same. It is clear that the TTF was established to broadly meet national 
budget deficits, support national economic development and achieve greater national 
financial autonomy, then why natural disasters as a great threat is excluded.  
However, it is not clearly stated in the TTF agreement that natural disasters are 
explicitly excluded. Given the recent threat from disasters (more than economic 
shocks), there should be a trigger clause in the TTF mandates to include disasters or 
they should revise and expand the TTF mandates to include some form of DRM 
function in it. 
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Second, the government can ask the international community to build and/or 
even contribute into the disaster fund. There are available and limited funds to tap 
into. However, the development should start from the national level with the 
government, i.e. through the Development Coordinating Committee (DCC) and the 
Cabinet levels.  Then it could be raised and promoted in the donors’ round-table 
meeting (DRM) with trusted development and diplomatic partners. This can be raised 
by the Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the Climate Change & Disaster Unit. 
At the international level, one way for example, is to be raised by the Prime Minister 
in his speech during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, 
then followed by advocating and promoting through side events with trusted 
representatives at the UN. This strategy can also be applied to other offices where 
Tuvalu is a member (World Bank and ADB) and represented (European Union (EU), 
NZ, Taiwan, and others) to advocate to the Diplomatic Corps especially their allies 
and those willing to help and contribute. We can also extend it to other international 
meetings focusing on climate change and disasters like the Convention of the Parties 
(COP) Meetings, UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, European Union 
Meetings and others. An example of a nearby event is the 23rd session of the COP (or 
COP 23) to the UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that will be organised 
by Fiji and hosted by the UNFCC Headquarters in Germany. It has to be strategic in 
nature and with the awareness of the members of the AOSIS (Alliance of the Small 
Island States) who will all attend. If there is a need for technical support, then the 
government can always turn to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and South 
Pacific Commission (SPC) as they both have Disaster Units too. 
Last but not the least, the government can have a mix strategy, where the 
government can start up the disaster fund by establishing it, and ask the international 
community who are willing to contribute into the fund. It can be seen as a 
responsibility to the main emission polluters (industrial nations) and a donation (for 
others). This disaster fund is part of building resilience to both climate change and 
disasters (since climate change induce disasters and their impact) which is an urgent 
need for small island countries in particular, and part of increasing adaptation and 
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mitigation efforts.30 The Green Climate Fund and maybe a future Loss-and-Damage 
compensation mechanism are other potential sources of funding. 
Nevertheless, these disaster funds could be converted into long-term investment 
funds comparable to the TTF and RERF when deemed viable and applicable.31 In this 
fashion, they could be operated separately in a sustainable manner that builds upon 
its capital with good governing rules to guide management and encourage prudent 
reinvestment and drawdown. It is also vital to allow space and time for the disaster 
funds to build-up in their initial phases as they transit to a sustainable stage with a 
sufficient principal value able to provide future sustainable revenue streams for 
supporting disaster risk reduction and management.32 With good governing rules, 
proper management, and prudent and relatively conservative fiscal policies for both 
of these funds, they should successfully achieve set targets and be sustainable in the 
long run. There should also be a buffer account to meet immediate response to 
disasters. Thus, they could contribute to DRR through disaster preparation, response, 
and recovery.  
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